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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
HOUSING PART R, COUNTY OF KINGS
Wyona Apartments LLC,
Petitioner,

L&T 90147/17-KI

- against –
Norberto Ramirez,

DECISION & ORDER
Respondents.

Zhuo Wang, J.:
Recitation pursuant to CPLR § 2219 (a) of the papers considered in the review of
this motion for a stay of this proceeding:
Papers
Numbered
OSC, Affirmation, and Exhibits
1
Opposition Papers
2
This is a nonpayment proceeding commenced in 2017 against Respondent
Norberto Ramirez (Norberto), the only alleged tenant-of-record who moved into the
subject premises five years ago. The petition alleges that the monthly legal regulated rent
is $2,100.00.
Make the Road New York (MRNY) represents Norberto as well as Consuelo Leon
(Leon) and Jesus Ramirez (Jesus), who live with Norberto. It is unclear whether Leon and
Ramirez were ever joined as Respondents; however, MRNY submitted a notice of
appearance on behalf of “Respondents” and served an amended answer claiming that
Leon and Jesus are the “rightful tenants and/or occupants entitled to possession of the
subject premises.” In their amended answer, verified by Leon, Respondents counterclaim
for rent overcharge claiming that the monthly rent should be $1,450.00.
Following eight adjournments – including a six-month period to complete
discovery – this case was sent to a trial part in early March. This Court scheduled a pretrial
conference pursuant to its Part Rules, for March 28, 2020. But that conference was
canceled due to the lockdown on March 17, 2020 as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.
This proceeding was effectively stayed until the Chief Administrative Judge issued

Administrative Order 160A/20 on August 13, 2020, which lifted the stay on residential
eviction matters commenced prior to March 17, 2020.
At a virtual pretrial conference on September 28, 2020, Petitioner’s counsel and a
staff attorney from MRNY, Aura Zuniga, Esq., appeared virtually. Leon also appeared
through her smartphone. Because Leon required a Spanish interpreter but none was
immediately available, the conference was delayed for about an hour. Due to the
challenge of hearing one another over the interpreter, as well as technical difficulties and
off-the-record attorney/client discussions regarding settlement, the conference lasted
approximately three hours. The parties were unable to settle, and a virtual trial was
scheduled to proceed on October 13, 2020. On October 13th trial date, Zuniga made an
application to adjourn the virtual trial date for her own health-related issues, which this
Court granted. The virtual trial is now scheduled for November 24, 2020 and December
2, 2020.
Respondents now move for, ostensibly, an indefinite stay of the proceedings
pursuant to CPLR § 2201. Petitioner opposes.
Arguments
On their motion, Respondents seek a stay of the proceeding pursuant to CPLR §
2201. They argue that holding a virtual trial violates their due process rights for three
reasons.

First, Respondents assert that Leon lacks the technology to meaningfully

participate at a virtual trial because, while she has a smartphone, she does not have a
computer or internet connection at home. Although she appeared at the September 28th
virtual conference through her smartphone, Respondents contend that Leon’s lack of a
larger monitor will render her unable to fully see an exhibit during the trial. Moreover,
Respondents assert that, when viewing these exhibits, Leon may not be visible – thereby
depriving this Court of the ability to adjudge her credibility. Incidentally, MRNY also
rejects alternatives that have been proposed including having Leon testify at MRNY’s

2

office or equipping her with an internet accessible computer so she can testify from her
home.1
The second reason asserted by Respondents is based on language-access. Zuniga
recounts the difficulty Leon experienced when listening to the Spanish interpreter
translate simultaneously while others were talking.

This method of interpretation

purportedly left Leon unable to comprehend much of what was said during the
conference in either Spanish or English. When this Court proposed an alternative at oral
argument by having the court-approved interpreter stayed muted but simultaneously
translate to Leon by phone, Zuniga expressed concerns about the quality of the
interpretation off-the-record.
Third, Respondents by way of Zuniga’s affirmation assert that a stay is warranted
because existing social distancing protocols coupled with Zuniga and Leon’s health
conditions have prevented them from meaningfully preparing for trial. Zuniga also affirms
that Respondents do not have an unlimited data plan, so she primarily consults with her
clients through phone calls and text messages. These limitations were so severe that
Zuniga claims that Leon was unable to notarize an affidavit in support of this motion,
although at oral argument it did not appear that MRNY had explored every reasonable
avenue to obtain such notarization. Zuniga adds that requests for government records
remain outstanding because agencies have been slower to respond since the pandemic.
Generally, Respondents point out that, because of the aforementioned technical
and linguistic challenges, the September 28th conference took three times longer than
originally planned. Additionally, Zuniga annexes a screenshot 2 of the virtual conference
and recalls a comment by this Court that other judges had reported frustrations with

In support, MRNY submits affidavits from its Operations Director, Antonia Genoa, and
its Legal Director, Sienna Fontaine, who both aver that these options are infeasible.
2
This Court in no way condones MRNY’s photographing the virtual proceedings without
notification or leave of court in violation of NY Ct R 29.1 (b).
1
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simultaneous interpretation during virtual court proceedings. In essence, Respondents
contend that the virtual trial will be riddled with so many complications and delays so as
to endanger their right to a fair trial.
In opposition, Petitioner contends that an indefinite stay of this proceeding is
unwarranted given that virtual trials have been held throughout the state and federal
courts. In point of fact, Leon already made a virtual appearance, namely, at the September
28th conference. Petitioner further asserts that this is a nonpayment proceeding while
cases of greater complexity are being heard virtually every day. Lastly, Petitioner argues
that the equities support denying a stay because Leon is not the tenant of record and
Respondents have undisputedly breached the parties’ stipulation by failing to pay
ongoing use & occupancy – a breach that occurred long before the mid-March shutdown
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Discussion
CPLR § 2201 provides that “[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law, the court
in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such
terms as may be just.” “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (see Mathews v Eldridge,
424 US 319, 333, 96 S Ct 893, 902, 47 L Ed 2d 18 [1976]).
There can be little dispute that the state of the current COVID-19 pandemic
sweeping the nation justifies conducting the instant trial by virtual means.

Indeed,

presented at the September 28th conference with choosing an in-person or virtual trial,
Respondents chose the latter. That a virtual trial is preferable to an in-person trial is not
in dispute. What is in dispute is whether holding a virtual trial in this particular instance
deprives Respondents of being heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) permits this Court to “ devise and make new process and
forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed
by it.” “By enacting Judiciary Law § 2–b (3), the Legislature has explicitly authorized the
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courts' use of innovative procedures . . . [and] courts may fashion necessary procedures
consistent with constitutional, statutory, and decisional law” (see People v Wrotten, 14
NY3d 33, 37 [2009]).
Because virtual testimony is certainly not the equivalent of in-person testimony, its
application requires a “case-specific finding of necessity” ( compare Matter of State v

Robert F., 25 NY3d 448, 454 [2015]). Additionally, this Court may fashion procedures
during the virtual trial to preserve the traditional elements of a fair trial, including
testimony under oath, the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and the
opportunity for this Court and the parties to view the witness's demeanor as he or she
testifies ( compare Wrotten, 14 NY3d at 39; see e.g. Sawant v Ramsey, 3:07-CV-980 VLB,
2012 WL 1605450, at *4 [D Conn May 8, 2012).
“Given the court closures required by the pandemic, the months' long delay that
has resulted, and the continuing lack of clarity about when it will be safe to resume normal
in-person operations, the courts have concluded that it is absolutely preferable to conduct
[a virtual trial] … rather than to delay [a] trial indefinitely” (see Ciccone v One W. 64th St.,

Inc. [Sup Ct, NY County, September 8, 2020]). In Ciccone, the Supreme Court (Leebovitz,
J.) rejected contentions that a virtual trial deprives the parties of due process and that the
costs for obtaining the technology to appear virtually is prohibitively expensive for an
attorney. Namely, the Ciccone court found that “technology used for video conferencing
is straightforward and easy to use and all that is required to participate in a trial by videoconference is a computer and internet access, which should be readily available to
counsel” (id at *7).
At the outset, Ciccone’s rationale based on technology that is “easily accessible to
counsel” is less compelling when applied to low-income tenants brought to Housing
Court on residential eviction cases. That is, an attorney’s purported inability to afford
videoconferencing technology should be distinguished from that of an indigent tenant’s.
In other words, the presumption that the modern practice of law should readily include a
5

computer and internet access does not hold for litigants, especially those of limited
financial means.
But applying a case-specific analysis to the principal litigant in this proceeding,
Leon, does not yield a significantly different outcome than that of the attorney in Ciccone.
Namely, the record of Leon’s virtual appearance at the September 28th conference belies
her assertion that she cannot meaningfully participate in a virtual trial. And while there
was, in fact, challenges in using simultaneous translation during that appearance, Judiciary
Law § 2-3 (b) empowers this Court to employ procedures to further ensure Leon’s
meaningful participation.
Namely, if listening to an interpreter simultaneously translate is infeasible, both
parties may consent to have the interpreter translate through a phone directly to Leon. If
MRNY is concerned about the integrity of the translation by a court-approved interpreter,
as they stated at oral argument, the court may address this by having sequential
interpretation on the record instead. This method of interpretation will undoubtedly
lengthen trial time, but simply because a trial takes longer does not mean that a trial
should not be had.
This Court is also unpersuaded that the occasional technical snafu experienced by
users of videoconferencing software renders virtual trials fundamentally unfair. This Court
has conducted numerous virtual trials via Microsoft Teams with both lawyers and selfrepresented litigants and finds that the traditional elements of a fair trial have all been
preserved. Namely, witnesses appearing virtually are sworn and cross-examination occurs
in real-time. Exhibits are shown to a witness through the share screen function of the
Teams application. The examiner is even able to request and obtain control of the
document during this process. As for the ability to view the witnesses’ demeanor while
an exhibit is being shown, this Court notes that the share screen function on MS Teams
does not obstruct this Court or others from viewing the witness during the process. Nor
does the size of Leon’s screen affect the size of the window by which she appears to
6

others. Additionally, MRNY’s concerns that Leon may not be able to read an exhibit
appear to be entirely speculative, and expecting her to zoom into a document if displayed
on her smartphone is not unreasonable in light of her prior appearance. In any event, the
ability to view a witness’ demeanor at all times during their testimony is but one factor in
analyzing that witness’ credibility. Lastly, at virtual trials, this Court customarily gives an
initial instruction to every virtual witness regarding the gravity of and consequences for
violating the oath and advises that the Court or any party – at any time – may direct the
witness to show the room from where the witness is testifying. These instructions and
safeguards are but one of many steps that can be taken to ensure a fair trial.
Finally, the equities in this particular proceeding militate against a stay. First, this
is a three-year-old nonpayment proceeding with discovery completed nearly one year
ago. Second, this is not only a summary proceeding commenced prior to March 17, 2020,
but it also one that was sent out to trial prior to the mid-March lockdown. Third, even
assuming they are “rightful tenants entitled to possession,” Respondents are not longterm, rent-stabilized tenants. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it is undisputed that
Respondents violated the terms of their own stipulation to pay ongoing use & occupancy
and that, to date, Respondents have made only four U&O payments in 2019 and three
this year. Indeed, long before the emergence of the current pandemic, Respondents
repeatedly failed to pay any rent – even the monthly amount that they themselves claim
to be the correct legal rent.
Although Respondents’ request for an indefinite stay must be denied, MRNY’s
difficulty in adequately preparing their clients for a virtual trial occurring less than two
days away persuades this Court that Respondents should be afforded more time to
prepare for that trial, conditioned upon Respondents’ payment of ongoing use &
occupancy. Indeed, Zuniga states that Leon’s cell phone plan limits her ability to virtually
prepare for a virtual trial. And extensive preparation is necessary since – contrary to
Petitioner’s characterization - this proceeding is not a “run-of-the-mill” nonpayment case.
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Rather, and more akin to a plenary action than a summary proceeding, the parties
consented to discovery, much of which relates to improvements allegedly made to the
subject premises in order to justify increases of nearly one-third of the legal regulated
rent. Incidentally, an adjournment of the virtual trial also addresses Respondents’ need
to obtain relevant records from government agencies.
After giving MRNY more time for trial preparation, this Court does not find that a
virtual trial in January 2021 deprives Respondents of due process. Said another way, a
virtual trial, while an imperfect mode to administer a trial, is not an unconstitutional one
in this instance.
This Court has considered the remainder of Respondents’ arguments and finds
them to be without merit. Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED that the motion for a stay of the proceedings is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the 11/24/20 and 12/2/20 trial dates are hereby vacated and the trial
is adjourned to allow time for MRNY to prepare her client for a virtual trial in January 2021
or as soon as practicable thereafter; and it is further
ORDERED that the above adjournment conditioned upon Respondent’s timely
payment of ongoing use & occupancy at $1450.00 by the first of each month commencing
December 1, 2020; and it is further
ORDERED that this matter is transferred to Part X for reassignment to another trial
judge; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall receive notification in due course from the assigned
judge as to a future trial date.
Dated: November 24, 2020

E N T E R:

_________/s/___________________
Hon. Zhuo Wan
Attorneys for Petitioner: Goldberg, Lustig, and Steckler;
Attorneys for Respondents: Make the Road New York
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